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China: Sources and 
Consequences 
Shang-  Jin Wei 
Whether it is a white cat or a black cat, it is a good one 
if it catches mice. 
Deng Xiaoping 
3.1  Introduction 
China used to be one of the most closed economies in terms of policy toward 
foreign investment and external debt. Starting from virtually no foreign-owned 
firms on Chinese soil before  1979, China has now become one of the largest 
developing host countries for foreign investment with the flow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) reaching $26 billion (U.S.) in  1993 (China State Statistics 
Bureau 1994). This dramatic change is part of the overall Chinese effort that 
began about 15 years ago to reform the economic system and open up to the 
outside world. The credo of  Deng Xiaoping (and his comrades) is measured 
pragmatism, as the epigraph indicates. Foreign investors may have greed as 
their motive, but they are welcome in China nevertheless, as long as their pres- 
ence helps China to grow. 
This paper has two objectives. First, it seeks to examine FDI in China from 
an international perspective. In particular, it asks whether China has received 
“enough” FDI from major source countries after controlling for key economic 
characteristics.  Second, the  paper  studies  several  consequences of  FDI  in 
China, particularly FDI’s contribution to China’s rapid growth, its exports, and 
its reform effort. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 3.2, I provide an overview of 
foreign-invested firms in China. In section 3.3, I attempt to put China’s hosting 
of FDI in an international perspective. Using data on outward investment from 
the five largest source countries, I estimate the average amount of FDI in a host 
country as a function of  several economic characteristics. China’s actual re- 
ceipt of investment from these countries is compared with the model predic- 
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tion. In section 3.4, I examine several economic consequences of FDI in the 
Chinese economy. A data set covering 434 cities over 1988-90  is employed to 
quantify these effects. Section 3.5 concludes the paper. 
3.2  General Features of Foreign Investment in China 
Before  1979, virtually no foreign-owned firms operated in China, nor did 
China have many external loans. Chinese leaders used to take pride in this fact. 
Indeed, even foreign aid volunteered by foreign governments or international 
organizations was viewed with suspicion. For example, after the great  1976 
earthquake in Tangshang (which registered about 8 on the Richter scale and 
caused millions of deaths), the Chinese government refused an aid offer from 
the International Red Cross. This attitude toward foreign money took a dra- 
matic turn in 1979 when Deng Xiaoping introduced economic reform and initi- 
ated the “open door policy.” 
Several factors contributed  to this change. Two  primary ones are (1) the 
disastrous economic performance under rigid central planning before 1979 and 
(2) the glittering examples of  Japan and the four Asian “tigers,” particularly 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Foreign capital going into China mainly takes the form of  loans. In  1991, 
the value of FDI was slightly more than 60 percent of that of loans. Over the 
period  1990-91,  the single fastest growing item in non-FDI foreign capital 
inflow was, in  fact, portfolio  investment (Chinese  bonds and equities pur- 
chased by foreigners). The growth rate was 3,55 l .5 percent. This is probably 
not as astonishing as it may  sound because China started from an extremely 
low position. Even with that exponential growth, the total amount of  bonds 
and equities issued in 1991 was only $108.45 million. 
This paper focuses on the sources and economic consequences of  direct 
investment. Two types of  data on direct investment are typically reported in 
Chinese statistics: contractual value and realized amount. “Contractual value” 
is supposedly the amount foreign investors plan or intend to invest in China 
(over a period of time) at the time the investment application is approved by 
the Chinese government. The actual investment is not bound by this contractual 
amount and is typically much smaller. Indeed, the reported contractual amount 
may even inflate the planned or intended investment because local government 
officials may  have an incentive to announce (or to lure foreign investors to 
agree on) a large number. For all practical purposes, only the realized amount, 
or what is sometimes called “actual utilization,” is economically meaningful. 
All data  on foreign investment below will be realized  values unless  noted 
otherwise. 
The growth of FDI in China truly has been exponential (table 3.1). During 
1979-8 1, the average annual inflow of FDI (excluding “compensation trade” 
and export processing) was less than $0.25 billion (Kueh 1992, table 2b). By 
1991, the total amount of realized FDI in China was already $4.37 billion. And 
the realized foreign capital in 1992 and 1993 reached $19.2 billion and $36.7 79  Foreign Direct Investment in China: Sources and Consequences 
Table 3.1  Realized FDI in China, 1983-93  (billion U.S. dollars) 
All Developing 
Year  China  Countries 
1983  0.64 
1984  1.26 
1985  1.66 
1986  1.88 
1987  2.3  1 
1988  3.19 
1989  3.39 
1990  3.49 
1991  4.37 
I992  11.20 









Sources: Data for  1983-90  are from Amirahmadi and Wu  (1994, table 2); the original source 
that the authors cite is Balance of  Payment Staristics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund, 1990 and 1991).  Data for 1991-93  are from China State Statistics Bureau (1994). 
billion, respectively; the one-year growth rate was 91.5 percent. The realized 
FDI in these two years was $1 1.2 billion and $25.76 billion, respectively, with 
a growth rate of 130 percent. By the end of 1993, the total number of registered 
foreign-investedmanaged  firms reached  167,500, of  which 83,100 (or 49.6 
percent of  the total) were newly established in  1993 (China State Statistics 
Bureau 1994). 
Foreign direct investment takes one of the following four forms: equity joint 
ventures, contractual joint ventures, wholly owned foreign firms, and joint ex- 
ploration (mainly for offshore oil). The values of the four forms of FDI during 
1990-91  are reported in table 3.2. In terms of percentage shares of total value 
in 1991, joint ventures and wholly owned foreign firms accounted for the lion’s 
shares of FDI (52.7 and 26.0 percent, respectively). The wholly owned foreign 
firm  has been the fastest growing form of FDI in recent years. In 1991, it had 
grown 66.10 percent over the 1990 value, after having a growth rate of 83.93 
percent in 1990 over 1989. 
In Chinese statistics, there is a third category of foreign capital aside from 
loans and FDI. The third category, called “other foreign investment” in official 
statistics, has three subcategories: leasing, compensation trade, and export pro- 
cessing/assembly. The values of these categories in 199  1 were $6.89 million, 
$208.25 million,  and $85.13 million, respectively. Altogether, other foreign 
investment is about 7 percent (300.27/4,366.34) as large as FDI. The biggest 
subcategory of the three, compensation trade, in which foreign firms provide 
machines or product designs to Chinese firms and obtain part of the output as 
payment, is no longer as popular as it was at the beginning of the open door 
policy reform.’ 
1. See Kueh (1992) for an analysis of the evolution of FDI  in China up to 1990, and particularly 
for his summary of the role of foreign investment in the development of  Chinese coastal areas. 80  Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 3.2  Realized Foreign Capital Going into China, 1990-91 
(million U.S. dollars) 
1990  1991 
Change over  Change over 
Capital  Amount  1989 (7’0)  Amount  1990 (96) 
Total 
External louns 
Loans from foreign governments 
Loans from international 
financial institutions 
Export credit 
Commercial bank loans 
Bonds and equity shares issued 
abroad 
Direct foreign investment 
Joint ventures 
Contractual joint ventnres 
Wholly owned foreign firms 
Joint exploration 




































































Source: China Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (1992, 1993). 
”The  percentage change reported in the original source (551.52 percent) appears to he an error. 
3.3  Sources of Foreign Investment from an International Perspective 
This section discusses FDI in China from an international perspective. To 
accomplish this, I will first estimate a gravity-type model to establish a “norm” 
for inward investment from major source countries and then determine whether 
China is an underachiever or overachiever as a host to FDI from these coun- 
tries. 
Worldwide FDI more than doubled in  nominal terms between  1975 and 
1985, and quadrupled between 1980 and 1990 to reach a record high of $200 
billion in 1989 and $234 billion in 1990 (United Nations 1992, 1993). To keep 
our discussion about FDI in China in perspective, we note that FDI is largely 
a “north-north” phenomenon. The developed countries accounted for 97 per- 
cent of all FDI outflows in the 1980s, reaching $226 billion in 1990. An over- 
whelming proportion of FDI also goes into developed countries. In terms of 
FDI inflows, the developed countries accounted for 83 percent in the 1985-90 
period (United Nations 1993). 
Of the FDI that does go into developing countries, the Asia-Pacific share has 
been increasing over time, from about 30 percent in 1980 to over 50 percent 
by 1989. In 1989, for example, of the $30 billion or so of FDI that went into the 81  Foreign Direct Investment in China: Sources and Consequences 
developing world, about $17 billion went into the Asia-Pacific region. Between 
1980-82  and  1986-88,  FDI had increased by  a factor of  three in the newly 
industrializing economies in the region and the ASEAN nations, and by a fac- 
tor of  13 in China (United Nations  1992). The rapid increase in the case of 
China certainly reflects its originally low base. 
The distribution  of  FDI in China in terms of major  source countries for 
1990-91  is summarized in table 3.3. In 1991, Hong Kong was the dominant 
supplier. Of the total FDI of $4.4 billion, Hong Kong contributed $2.4 billion, 
or about 55 percent. This is a typical pattern. Hong Kong’s share in total FDI 
in China has been above 50 percent for all but one year since the beginning of 
the open door policy in 1979. One should note, however, that part of  the re- 
ported Hong Kong investment is actually Taiwanese investment in disguise (to 
avoid political inconvenience with the Taiwanese government). Another (small) 
part of the reported Hong Kong investment is really mainland Chinese capital 
in disguise (to take advantage of the preferential treatment accorded to foreign 
capital by the mainland). 
Japan is the second largest source country. With an investment of  $532.50 
million in 1991, it accounted for 12.2 percent of the total. The next two major 
Table 3.3  Source Country Distribution of FDI in China: Flow Data 
(million U.S. dollars) 
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suppliers are the United States and Germany, accounting for 7.4 and 3.7 per- 
cent, respectively. It is worth noting that other East Asian economies, particu- 
larly those with a large Chinese diaspora, such as Macao, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Indonesia, have also supplied a significant amount of  direct investment 
to China. 
The primitive and imperfect legal regime in China is one important reason 
for the lopsided distribution of the supply of FDI. On the one hand, investors 
from the United States and other large home countries of multinational corpo- 
rations are wary about the security and stability of their investment in China. 
On the other hand, the overseas Chinese (particularly those residing in Hong 
Kong) can use their cultural and linguistic links to help reduce information and 
contractual costs. To  contribute to the  skewed source country  distribution, 
some regions in China offer explicit or implicit preferential policies to overseas 
Chinese who trace their ancestry to those regions. 
There is another distinct characteristic of investment from overseas Chinese 
that may  be worth noting. The average size of investment from an overseas 
Chinese investor is much smaller than that from non-ethnic Chinese. One ex- 
planation is simply that overseas Chinese tend to have small or medium-sized 
firms (either for cultural reasons or because the industries they typically oper- 
ate in have small optimal scales). The other explanation, which I find at least 
as plausible as the first, is a transaction cost story associated with China’s prim- 
itive legal system. Other things equal, imperfect legal protection implies a high 
transaction cost for firms in  China because learning ill-defined customs and 
vague operating rules is costly. Overseas Chinese can largely circumvent this 
problem by using their linguistic and cultural advantage or personal connec- 
tions. Hence, non-ethnic Chinese investors may perceive a higher transaction 
cost than overseas Chinese. Suppose this transaction  cost is basically  fixed 
(i.e., does not depend on the size of investment), then small projects may not be 
worth enough to overcome this cost and are never implemented. The minimum 
amount of investment for non-ethnic  Chinese is thus larger than for overseas 
Chinese.2 
3.3.1  Toward an Empirical Model of FDI Distribution 
A norm for bilateral investment is notoriously difficult to establish because 
FDI is likely to be  influenced by  a long list of  factors, many of which are 
difficult to measure or observe. I consider a reduced-form  specification for 
bilateral investment (flow or stock). Let I, be direct investment from country i 
to country j.  We have 
I will explain the three categories of determinants in turn. We take X, to be a 
vector of variables that influence the measured size of the overall magnitude 
2. 1 thank Chongen Bai for suggesting this interpretation. 83  Foreign Direct Investment in China: Sources and Consequences 
of outward investment from country i; it includes legal restrictions on or incen- 
tives for capital outflow, including country  i’s corporate tax schedule and the 
treatment of foreign affiliate tax payment to host country  governments. The 
key feature of variables in this vector is that they are common to all outward 
investments  of  country  i, irrespective  of  destination.  (In  our sample, most 
countries’ outward direct investment is realized investment, but some countries 
such as Japan report only government approval data. Our X  vector should in- 
clude an indicator for the deviation of country  i’s  measurement  method from 
the “normal” definition of FDI in the sample.) Our statistical specification in 
the later part of the paper allows us to be less specific about this vector. 
is a vector of variables related to the overall attractiveness 
of countryj to FDI. I will divide the factors into two subcategories. The first 
group includes macroeconomic characteristics of the host country, such as size 
(measured by GNP), level of development, and level of human capital.3 The 
second subcategory includes all restrictions on and incentives for inward for- 
eign investment. Many countries grant tax holidays or reduced taxes on foreign 
companies’ profits. This provides incentives for certain source countries to di- 
rect their outward-going capital to such host countries. 
Finally, Z,, is a vector of variables that are specific to the ij pair and that 
influence the incentives or disincentives for investment going from country  i 
to country j. One principal variable in this vector is a bilateral treaty between 
countries i and j that includes offering country  i’s  investors a more favorable 
tax treatment in country j relative to investors from other co~ntries.~  The other 
important variable in this vector is ethnic, linguistic, or historical ties that serve 
to reduce information costs for business transactions taking place between na- 
tionals of countries i and j. This variable is not easy to measure. As a proxy, 
geographic distance is used. In particular, this paper computes the “great circle 
distance” between major cities (usually the capitals) of a given pair of coun- 
tries. 




log FDIv = ct8 + p, log GNP, + p,  log 
POP, 
+ p, log Distancev + p,  Literacy, + p,. 
3.3.2  Data 
The basic data set for this part of the paper is outward FDI from the five 
largest source countries in the 1987-90  period. The source is United Nations 
3. Recent work on “new” growth theory implies that human capital in the host country plays an 
4.  See Hines and Wilard (1992) for an interesting analysis of the determinants in reaching bilat- 
important role in FDI decisions (see Lucas 1990). 
eral tax treaties. 84  Shang-Jin Wei 
(1992). I will also make use of GNP, per capita GNP, and literacy data from 
World Bank (1992). 
The  five  largest  source countries for  direct  investment  over  the  period 
1987-90 were Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Ger- 
many (United Nations 1992). Their annual average outflows of investment dur- 
ing the period were $36.5, $30.5, $23.9, $19.5, and $17.1 billion, respectively. 
The total investment outflow from the five accounted for about 70.5 percent of 
all outward investment from the developed countries. 
3.3.3  Basic Results 
Table 3.4 reports the basic regression results for the flow of  FDI. Column 
(1)  reports  the  result  of  a  fixed-effects  regression  assuming  source- 
country-specific  intercepts. The coefficient for the GNP variable is positive 
and significant as expected. A 1 percent increase in the size of a host country 
is associated with a 0.53 percentage point increase in FDI. A 1 percent increase 
in per capita GNP is associated with a 0.42 percentage point increase in FDI 
flow. Furthermore, geography matters: a 1 percent increase in distance is asso- 
ciated with a 0.39 percentage point reduction in FDI. This confirms our casual 
impression that outward foreign investment is highly regionali~ed.~  Investment 
is, to some extent, a neighborhood event. It is worth pointing out that, in spite 
of a less rigorous microfoundation for the specification, the adjusted R2  of over 
0.50 is reasonably large for a cross-country regression. 
A  competing  specification for  the  panel  data  set  is  what  is  called the 
random-effects model. In such a model, the source-country-specific  intercept 
is assumed to be a random draw from a common distribution that is uncorre- 
lated with the error term of  the regression (Hsiao  1986). Strictly speaking, 
since the five source countries are not randomly drawn from the pool of  all 
source countries, but rather are chosen deliberately because they are the largest 
source countries, the fixed-effects model is the appropriate model to use. On 
the other hand, because a random-effects model can often result in drastically 
different coefficient estimates (Hsiao 1986,41-42), it is performed here purely 
as a robustness check of our fixed-effects model. The result is reported in col- 
umn (2). Luckily, for our data set, the random-effects specification produces 
essentially the same estimates as the fixed-effects model. 
It may be useful to comment a bit more on the positive sign of the coefficient 
of the per capita GNP term. One often hears the hypothesis that direct invest- 
ment seeks countries with low labor costs. Since wage level should be highly 
correlated with per capita GNP, one would expect a negative sign for the per 
capita GNP term. Why do we obtain a statistically significant positive sign? 
One explanation is that per capita GNP is positively correlated with a country’s 
5.  Hufbauer, Lakdawalla, and Malani (1994) have estimated a gravity-type model for outward 
investment from the United States, Japan, and Germany and reported, among other things, a geo- 
graphic bias in FDI. 85  Foreign Direct Investment in China: Sources and Consequences 
Table 3.4  Norm of Inward FDI: Flow 
Variable 
Random 
Fixed Effect  Random Effect"  Fixed Effect  Effectb 
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Equarion:  log FDI-flow,, = (Y, + p, log GNP, + p,  log PCGNP, + p,  log Distancee + f3,  Litera- 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
aVariance of I*.,,  = 2.5574, variance of  01  = 0.30320, implied differencing factor = 0.1 1808. 
Variance of p,, = 2.3180, variance of (Y = 0.34868, implied differencing factor = 0.10962. 
"Significant at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level. 
cy, + l%,. 
level of human capital. Recent theories of economic growth that emphasize 
the importance of human capital accumulation (e.g., Lucas 1990) predict that 
inward foreign investment is positively correlated with the stock of human cap- 
ital in the host country. Hence, per capita GNP can be positively correlated 
with inward investment. 
To investigate this possibility, I adopt the adult literacy ratio as a crude mea- 
sure of average human capitaL6 (In the sample, the simple correlation between 
per capita GNP and adult literacy is 0.56.) Columns (3)  and (4) of table 3.4 
report the results with the literacy variable as an additional regressor. The point 
estimate for the variable is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. According to the estimate in the fixed-effects  regression,  a  1 percent 
increase in the literacy ratio is associated with a 1.57 percentage point higher 
inward FDI. The qualitative features of the estimates for the other variables do 
6. The data are converted from adult illiteracy ratios from World Bank (1992, table I). No data 
are reported  for high-income  economies. But they  are noted in the table as having less than 5 
percent illiteracy according to Unesco. Hence, a value of 2.5  percent illiteracy is assigned for all 
high-income economies. 86  Shang-Jin Wei 
not change (the point estimates for the GNP and per capita GNP terms become 
somewhat smaller). 
The flow data on FDI may reflect the peculiarity of year-to-year fluctuation 
in the spatial distribution of foreign investment. For example, during 1989-90, 
FDI going into China was greatly reduced as a result of the international reac- 
tion to the Tiananmen Square Incident. In addition, the stock of FDI is more 
important than the flow variable for many calculations, including the contribu- 
tion of foreign investment to host country production capacity. For these rea- 
sons, I also look at the spatial distribution of the stock of FDI. 
Table 3.5 reports the basic regression  results for the FDI stock data. The 
crucial result is the estimates of the fixed-effects model. The coefficient on the 
GNP variable is 0.74 (somewhat larger than the flow regression) and signifi- 
cant at the 1 percent level. It suggests that larger economies tend to host more 
foreign investment, although the increment in foreign investment is less than 
proportional to the increase in the size of the host country. The coefficient on 
per capita GNP is 0.29 and significant. Again, the stock of foreign investment 
tends to be distributed among rich countries. As with the flow data, part of the 
reason for this may be that the average level of human capital is an important 
Table 3.5  Norm of Inward FDI: Stock 
Variable 
Fixed Effect  Random Effectd  Fixed Effect  Random Effect’ 


























































Equarion: log FDI-stock,, = a,  + p, log GNP, + pL  log PCGNP, + p,  log Distance,, + p,  Litera- 
Noret  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
‘Variance of I”,, = 3.1747, variance of  CY  = 0.24515, implied differencing factor  = 0.13496. 
’Variance of p,,  = 2.2200, variance of a = 0.35987, implied differencing factor = 0.8439OE-01. 
#Significant at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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determinant of the marginal value of physical capital and the former is corre- 
lated with per capita GNP. 
In columns (3) and (4), the adult literacy variable is again added to the re- 
gressions as a measure of average human capital. The coefficient for the new 
variable is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. A 1 percent rise in the 
adult literacy level is associated with a 1.57 percentage point increase in the 
stock of foreign investment. As expected, the point estimate on the per capita 
GNP variable is reduced (to 0.18), although it remains positive and significant. 
3.3.4  Comparing China and Asia to the “Norm” 
The statistical model in the last section has effectively established a “norm” 
for inward foreign investment (from the five largest source countries) as a func- 
tion of a host country’s size, level of development, level of human capital, and 
geographic  location. Against  this  empirical norm,  we  can  then  investigate 
whether China, or any other country, has attracted “enough” foreign capital. 
I will examine the difference  between  actual foreign  investment and the 
model predictions for China, India, and the four Asian newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs). The basic economic characteristics of the six economies 
are summarized in table 3.6. The computed differences of inward investment 
relative to the norm are reported in table 3.7. Column (1) refers to FDI flow, 
and column (2) to FDI stock. 
Despite the fact that China was one of the largest developing host countries 
for FDI by the end of the 1980s, it may still not be hosting enough FDI after 
one adjusts its FDI volume by its size and other characteristics. This appears 
to be the case. In terms of flow of  FDI in  1989-90,  China does not seem to 
have attracted enough investment from four of  the major source countries (the 
United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom).’ For example, it 
received 88 percent less investment from Germany than it should have based 
on its economic characteristics (exp(-2.145)  -  1). The FDI that China hosts 
from Japan is an exception to this pattern. The actual Japanese investment go- 
ing into China in 1990  was actually 25 percent more than the model prediction 
(exp(0.229) - 1). The Japanese investment in China will probably stay high. 
As was revealed in two surveys of Japanese firms conducted by Japan’s Export- 
Import Bank in 1992 and 1993, China was believed to be the most promising 
destination for Japanese FDI in the medium-term (i.e., three years following 
the survey years; Kinoshita 1994). 
Chinese underachievement in attracting FDI in 1990 could partly be due to 
source country reaction to the Tiananmen Square Incident. But the stock of 
FDI should be less affected by this. The discrepancy between actual and pre- 
dicted values of the FDI stock is given in column (2). As expected, the extent 
of underachievement is less than for the flow data in all cases. Nevertheless, 
China has attracted less than normal investment from four of  the five major 
7. A blank entry in table 3.7 means that the recorded actual investment is zero. 88  Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 3.6  Country Indicators, 1990 
GNP per Capita  GNP 
Country  ($1  (million $)  Literacy Rate 
China  370  419,469  0.73 
Hong Kong  1 1,490  66,642  0.77 
India  350  297,325  0.48 
Korea  5,400  231,120  0.975 
Singapore  11,160  33,480  0.88 
Taiwan  7,284  147,384  0.932 
Source: World Bank (1992). 
source countries even according to the stock data. For example, the U.S. invest- 
ment  that  China  hosts  falls  short  of  its  potential  by  almost  89 percent 
(exp(-2.20) -  1). 
Part  of  the reason  for China’s underachievement  is its late entry into the 
game. The open door policy was only a decade old in  1990. The more im- 
portant reason for the underachievement is the imperfect legal protection that 
China still offers to foreign investors. Luckily, overseas Chinese appear less 
concerned about the legal environment and have made stakes in the country in 
large numbers. The investment from overseas Chinese perhaps makes up for 
much of the shares lost from the major source countries in the world. 
We should note that the GNP and per capita GNP variables may have sub- 
stantially underestimated China’s true size and level of development. After ad- 
justing for purchasing  power,  the World  Bank and International  Monetary 
Fund found that China’s per capita GNP was likely to be on the order of $2,000 
rather  than $370 as reported  in table 3.6. A more conservative measure  by 
Lardy (1994) put the estimate at $1,000. This would still increase the magni- 
tude of  China’s GNP and per capita GNP by a factor of  1.7 relative to the 
exchange-rate-based  measure. If PPP-adjusted values were used in estimating 
the FDI model, one would expect even greater underachievement by China in 
attracting FDI from the major source countries. 
(On the other hand, the reported literacy rate may overestimate the average 
level of human capital. If secondary school enrollment or other variables were 
used as a measure of human capital, the magnitude of  Chinese underachieve- 
ment would become somewhat smaller.) 
India has many similarities with China, in terms of size, level of develop- 
ment, as well as history of policy toward FDI. In terms of stock of FDI, India 
has hosted too little FDI from all major source countries except Britain. (Being 
a former British colony helps in this case.) But in terms of recent flow of FDI, 
India is catching up fast, particularly with FDI from the United States.* 
The four Asian NIEs are all well known to be very open in terms of  their 
8. See Reddy (1994) for a more detailed discussion 89  Foreign Direct Investment in China: Sources and Consequences 
Table 3.7  Actual -  Predicted FDI 
Flow  Stock 
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Spe-czjicution  of  models  I,  log FDI-flowr = a,  + p, log GNP, + p,  log PCGNP,  + p,  log Dis- 
tance,, + p,  Literacy, + p,,,  11,  log FDI-stock,, = a,  + p, log GNP, + p2  log PCGNP, + p,  log 
Distance, + p,  Literacy, + p,, 
trade policies.  However, their policies  toward  FDI differ  markedly.  On one 
extreme, Singapore and Hong Kong are very open to foreign investment. Both 
have hosted a substantially greater stock of FDI than an average economy in 
the world with similar economic and geographic characteristics. On the other 
extreme, Taiwan and Korea are much more cautious toward foreign-invested 
firms on their territories. Both host less than average direct investment from 
the four major source countries (the United States, Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom). 90  Shang-Jin Wei 
To summarize, in contrast to its reception of vast investment from overseas 
Chinese,  China  so far has not  attracted enough direct  investment from the 
United States and European source countries. However, this is not drastically 
different from the situations in Taiwan and Korea. 
3.4  Economic Consequences of  Foreign Capital in China 
In the second half of the paper,  I will discuss several consequences of for- 
eign investment in China. Specifically, I will concentrate on three aspects of 
foreign investment: (1) its contribution to overall rapid growth, (2)  its contribu- 
tion  to the rapid  growth  of  China's  exports,  and  (3) its contribution  to the 
expansion of the nonstate  sector in China. Much of  my evidence is derived 
from a statistical analysis of a city-level data set covering the period 1988-90.' 
In an earlier paper (Wei  1995), I  reviewed the evolution  of  China's  open 
door policy and discussed the contribution of export activity and foreign in- 
vestment to China's  rapid growth. The following discussion differs from the 
earlier paper in several important aspects. First, new questions are asked, par- 
ticularly in terms of the connection between foreign investment and the expan- 
sion of the nonstate sector. Second, the treatment of foreign investment is more 
refined. In the previous paper, only the flow of FDI was used in the statistical 
analysis, whereas here the stock of foreign capital is computed and analyzed. 
Furthermore, a measure of the stock of aggregate city-level physical capital is 
added  so that  the  statistical  specification  corresponds  better  with  the  eco- 
nomic theory. 
I will first sketch a theoretical model that will be the basis of  my statistical 
investigation. After an explanation of the data set, I will present the main statis- 
tical results and draw economic inferences. 
3.4.1  A Minimalist Model 
To guide later statistical analyses, a parsimonious specification will be suf- 
ficient. Let city j operate with the following production function: 
= AJLpKPH; 
where L, K, and Hare the city's labor force, stock of physical capital, and stock 
of human capital, respectively, and A is a productivity shift parameter. 
The productivity shift parameter can be conceptually decomposed into na- 
tional and city-specific components. For simplicity, assume that 
9. For recent analyses of the relationship between FDI and home economies and of other issues, 
see Feldstein (1995), Lipsey (1995). and Froot (1993). 91  Foreign Direct Investment in China: Sources and Consequences 
where S,  and S,  are the national and city-specific components of the productiv- 
ity shift parameter. 
Use g to denote any growth rate. The above specification can be translated 
into growth terms. 
g,  = gs” + g,,  + “&,  + Ps,  + YgH; 
The central focus for the second half of the paper is on the impact of foreign 
investment. Foreign investment in city j could affect the city’s output in three 
ways. First, it may raise growth of the city’s overall capital stock, g  Second, 
it may increase city j’s overall productivity growth, g, .  Third, if beneficial ef- 
fects spill over to other cities in the country, it may raise the growth of  the 
national productivity level, gsn. 
Foreign investment  can raise productivity  through a number of  channels. 
First, many foreign firms bring new technology (“software,”  such as product 
design, as well as “hardware,” such as machinery) to the host country. Second, 
and perhaps more important in the Chinese context, foreign firms bring mod- 
em management concepts, marketing techniques, and work discipline. Third, 
even domestic firms that do not directly receive foreign investment may benefit 
from it by learning and mimicking the management, marketing, or production 
techniques of  foreign-owned firms. This spillover effect from foreign-owned 
to domestic firms stems from the fact that learning is greatly helped by physical 
proximity and human interactions. 
If  foreign investment  in city j  raises the growth of national productivity, 
gSn,  through cross-city  spillover, it will merely enlarge the intercept term in a 
cross-city regression. Hence, our identification  of the contribution of the for- 
eign investment falls on g, . In actual implementation, I will assume that g  is 
a linear function of  the stock of  FDI in city j and that the functional form is 
the same for all cities. 
3.4.2  Data 
The data  set  employed  here  covers  434 cities  over  the  period  1988-90 
(China State Statistics Bureau 1989, 1991). The 434 cities constituted the en- 
tire universe of  cities in China in  1988. Moreover, the data cover areas sur- 
rounding each city (greater city area) rather than just the metropolitan area. 
This helps to avoid certain sample selection biases, such as uncovering a rela- 
tionship that is peculiar to the coastal areas or the special economic zones. 
A few general features of the data set should be noted to put the subsequent 
regression results in perspective. During  1988-90,  the average growth rate of 
gross  industrial  output  across  the  cities  was  39.8 percent  (and the output- 
weighted average was close to this as well). Note also that these two years were 
a relatively slow growing period in a fast-growing decade. 
It may be interesting to note the growth rate of foreign-invested firms rela- 
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tive to other types of  firms. Table 3.8 reports the (nominal) growth rates by 
ownership type. lo  The first three types, individual-owned  firms (INDs), town- 
ship and village enterprises (TVEs), and foreign-invested firms (FORs) consti- 
tute over half of the nonstate sector in China.” All three categories grew faster 
than  the  average growth rate of  total  output. But the foreign-invested  firms 
grew the fastest. The two-year growth rate was, an astonishing 119.4 percent. 
(The combined two-year inflation rate during the period was about 18 percent. 
So the real two-year growth rate for the foreign-invested firms was about 100 
percent.) 
Although  foreign-invested  firms were growing quickly, they were tiny  in 
terms of  their share in  total  industrial output  (table 3.9).  In  1988, foreign- 
invested firms accounted for less than  1 percent of total output. The share al- 
most doubled to l .7  l  percent by the end of 1990. In contrast, the state sector 
shrank rapidly  in  relative  terms. The state  sector  lost  almost  5 percentage 
points in share of total output over a two-year period. Most of this lost ground 
was gained by the TVEs. 
What makes the subsequent regression  analysis interesting is the tremen- 
dous variation  across the  cities. For example, the  share of foreign-invested 
firms in total output ranges from 0 to 62.1 percent in 1988. (About 115 cities in 
1988 had a positive stock of foreign investment.) The growth rates of foreign- 
invested firms also vary tremendously, from -92  percent (exp(-2.821) - 1) 
to 11,050 percent (exp(4.714) - I)! 
3.4.3  Foreign Investment and Total Output Growth 
We start our analysis with the contribution of foreign investment to China’s 
overall industrial growth. The benchmark results  are reported  in table 3.10. 
The dependent variable in all four regressions is the city’s growth rate in gross 
industrial output. 
In the first regression, the growth rates of capital stock and labor force are 
the only two regressors other than the intercept. Both variables are statistically 
significant at the  10 percent level. The point estimates for capital growth and 
labor growth are 0.17 and 0.25, respectively. The apparent decreasing returns 
to scale could reflect the technical inefficiency of  many Chinese firms, espe- 
cially the state-owned firms. 
I introduce foreign investment into the regression in two ways. First, I use 
the beginning-of-sample (i.e., 1988) share of the stock of foreign capital in the 
city’s total  capital. Second, I use the beginning-of-sample  share of  foreign- 
invested firm  output in the city’s total output. 
There are two variations in the first approach depending on the assumption 
10. For  simplicity. I  will refer to wholly foreign-owned, equity or contractual joint ventures, 
and joint explorations as “foreign-invested firms.” 
I I.  The other category within the nonstate sector is “urban collectives,’’  which I do not have data 
on. For a detailed discussion of the four categories of the nonstate sector, see Wei and Lian (1993). Table 3.8  Two-Year Growth Rates of Gross Industrial Output, 1988-90 
(434 Chinese cities) 
IND  TVE  FOR  “State”  Total 
Simple average  1.137  0.492  1.194  0.305  0.398 
Minimum  -0.993  -0.730  -2.821  -2.505  -0.304 
Maximum  38.366  12.383  4.714  3.442  7.739 
N  343  348  115  334  363 
Table 3.9  Share in Industrial Output by Type of Firms, 1988-90 
(434 Chinese cities) 











































Table 3.10  Foreign Investment and City’s Total Output Growth, 1988-90 
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Notes:  Dependent variable is growth rate of  gross industrial output during  1988-90.  See the ap- 
pendix for definitions of independent variables. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity- 
consistent standard errors. All regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
“Significant at the 15 percent level. 
#Significant  at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 94  Shang-Jin Wei 
of the depreciation of foreign capital. In the first variation, a 10 percent depre- 
ciation rate is assumed when accumulating the annual flow of FDI into a stock 
measure.  (The official exchange rate in  1988 of 3.72 yuaddollar is used  to 
convert the dollar value of FDI stock into Chinese yuan.) The result is reported 
in column (2). We observe that the foreign capital share variable has a positive 
coefficient (0.072), which would be consistent with the hypothesis that foreign 
investment raises city-specific productivity. Unfortunately, it is not statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
Because the  annual flows of  FDI are in nominal U.S. dollar terms, a  10 
percent nominal depreciation rate implies a greater real depreciation rate (10 
percent plus the annual inflation rate). Furthermore, the reported city capital 
stock is likely  to assign  an insufficient  depreciation  rate to capital stock in 
Chinese firms. This could further underestimate the true ratio of foreign capital 
to the city’s total capital stock. Partly as a correction to this problem, I also use 
the second variation, in which a zero nominal rate of depreciation is assumed 
for FDI (i.e., the real rate of depreciation is approximately equal to the U.S. 
inflation rate). This assumption gives the regression result in column (3). This 
time, the estimate is statistically significant at the 15 percent level. A 1 percent 
increase in the share of foreign capital in the city’s capital stock in  1988 is 
associated with a 0.065 higher growth rate of  industrial output in the subse- 
quent two-year period. Although the positive sign is consistent with a produc- 
tivity-lifting role for FDI, the point estimate is not terribly big. 
The uncertainty about the depreciation rate (and, to a lesser extent, the ex- 
change rate used to convert FDI from dollar values into yuan values) means 
that the foreign capital share variable probably has serious measurement prob- 
lems. The measurement error could introduce a downward bias into the mea- 
sured estimate of the contribution of FDI stock to overall growth. 
An alternative measure of the significance of foreign capital is the share of 
foreign-invested firm output in a city’s total output. This variable is much easier 
to measure and should circumvent the difficulties  in properly  measuring the 
stock of FDI. The regression result with this variable is in column (4) of table 
3.10. This share variable is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. Holding the growth of inputs constant, a I percent increase in the share 
of foreign-invested firms in output in  1988 is associated with a 0.32 percent 
higher growth rate in output during 1988-90.  This is a more significant num- 
ber. In table 3.9, we found that the difference between the cities with the high- 
est and those with an average share of foreign firms in output was 61 percent. 
This could produce an almost 20 (61*0.32) percentage point difference in the 
growth rate of output. 
3.4.4  Introducing Human Capital and Coastal Areas 
One omission from the regressions in section 3.4.3 is a measure of the stock 
of  human capital. Human capital plays a central role in (one branch  of) the 
new growth theory. I will add to the basic regression the share of skilled labor 95  Foreign Direct Investment in China: Sources and Consequences 
in a city’s labor force as a measure of the average level of a city’s human capital. 
Table 3.11 replicates the key regressions  in table 3.10 with the additional 
variable, GHumCap, the growth of the average human capital level. The added 
variable is not significant for the first two regressions but is significant (at the 
10 percent level) for the regression that includes the share of foreign firm out- 
put in total output. The feature to notice, however, is that the qualitative charac- 
teristics of FDI remain the same as before. In particular, in columns (2) and 
(3),  FDI exhibits a positive and statistically significant association with growth 
in total output. 
One may think that one important impetus for rapid growth in certain parts 
of  China is a favorable  policy  environment. A priori,  a combination of the 
following three things could together explain the observed pattern: (1) Local- 
ized reform experiments promote growth. (2) Foreign investment does not con- 
tribute to growth beyond contribution to the capital stock. (3) Foreign invest- 
ment  happens  to  be  concentrated  in  cities  with  many  localized  reform 
experiments. In other words, the apparent positive association between foreign 
investment and high growth could be a spurious result of not having a measure 
of localized reform experiments in the regression. 
To  investigate this possibility, I will identify subsets of cities that may have 
had intensive reform experiments. The “special economic zones” (SEZs) are 
Table 3.11  Foreign Investment, Human Capital, and City’s Total Output 
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Notes: Dependent variable is growth rate of gross industrial output during  1988-90. See the ap- 
pendix for definitions of  independent variables. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity- 
consistent standard errors. All regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
?3ignificant at the 15 percent level. 
“Significant at the  10  percent level. 
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one such subset. Four cities (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen) were 
declared SEZs in 1980. The entire island province of Hainan was made to be 
an SEZ (“special area open to foreign investment” in official terms) in  1983. 
In an SEZ, tax concessions and fewer restrictions on foreign exchange and land 
use are deployed to attract foreign investment. But a large quantity of domestic 
investment has been stimulated in SEZs by the same or similarly beneficial en- 
vironments. 
The 14 “open coastal cities” are the second such subset. An  open coastal 
city can offer much the same benefits to foreign (and often to domestic) invest- 
ors that SEZs do. Its income tax  is less favorable than in an SEZ but more 
favorable than in the rest of the country. 
The third subset of special cities is the group of 72 “comprehensive reform 
experimenting cities,.’ designated by either the central or provincial  govem- 
ment. The governments of these cities are supposed to have greater authority in 
managing firms inside their city boundaries, and greater access to the revenue 
originating in them, and can take over certain firms previously  managed di- 
rectly by the ministries in Beijing. 
I create two dummies to investigate possible special effects of these cities. 
The first dummy, Open, is for SEZs and open coastal cities. The second, Re- 
form, is for the 72 comprehensive reform experimenting cities. In my previous 
paper (Wei 1996), I found that an open coastal city or an SEZ does grow faster 
than the national  average by about  18 percentage points if  one only controls 
for labor force growth, but not for capital stock growth. The 72 reform experi- 
menting cities did not grow any faster than an average city in the sample after 
controlling for the growth of the labor force. 
We  now have a measure of the growth in capital stock as well. Table 3.12 
reports regression results with these two dummies. This time, even the coastal 
open cities and  SEZs do not  seem to be  more special than  an average city 
after controlling for capital stock growth. Indeed, the point estimate is slightly 
negative (but insignificantly different from zero). In other words, the uncondi- 
tionally  high  growth rates  in  these cities can be  entirely accounted  for by 
higher than average input growth. These cities are special because of their abil- 
ity to accumulate (or attract) capital and labor inputs at a rapid rate. 
The qualitative features of foreign capital measures in the last three regres- 
sions are similar to the previous results.  Indeed, the point estimates tend to 
become slightly larger with marginally increased significance levels. 
3.4.5  Foreign Investment and Exports 
It  has been  widely  commented  that foreign-invested  firms in  China have 
helped to increase China’s exports to the outside world. The importance of 
foreign-invested firms in China’s exports has grown rapidly. Its share increased 
from about 1 percent in the mid-1980s to 27.5 percent in  1993 (Lardy 1994, 
72, table 3.9). 
The high and increasing export propensity of foreign-invested firms relative 97  Foreign Direct Investment in China: Sources and Consequences 
Table 3.12  Foreign Investment, Coastal Cities, and Growth, 1988-90 
(434 Chinese cities) 
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Nores: Dependent variable is growth rate of gross industrial output during 1988-90. See appendix 
for definitions of independent variables. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. All regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
"Significant at the 15 percent level. 
#Significant at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
to Chinese firms has much to do with the export performance criteria that the 
Chinese government imposes on them. But before we conclude that China's 
overall export level has been raised by the presence of foreign-invested firms, 
we must entertain some other possibilities. 
Foreign-invested firms could displace exports by Chinese firms. This may 
happen if foreign-invested firms compete head to head with Chinese firms and 
possibly drive them out of export-related activities. Depending on how much 
Chinese exports are displaced by foreign-invested firms, overall Chinese ex- 
ports could be lower than without foreign firms. Alternatively, foreign-invested 
firms could promote export activities among Chinese firms. This may happen, 
for example, when the foreign-invested firms pass on, intentionally or not, mar- 
keting know-how to Chinese firms which otherwise may not be able to sell in 
the world market. If  this happens, overall Chinese exports can be raised by 
more than the exports of the foreign-invested firms. 
The point is that the net effect of  foreign  investment on China's  exports 
depends on the way the foreign investment and the export activities of Chinese 
firms interact. With city-level data on exports by state trading corporations (the 
bulk of non-foreign-firm exports), I can investigate this interaction. 
In various regressions, I find that the cross-city differences in export activity 98  Shang-Jin Wei 
are not statistically related to either the difference in the growth of FDI or the 
difference in the initial stock of foreign capital. (The results are not reported to 
save space.) Thus, I conclude that foreign-invested firm exports do not displace 
Chinese firm exports. They may help to promote Chinese exports if enough 
marketing know-how is spilled over to other cities in the country (and thus not 
related to city-level exports). 
3.4.6  Foreign Investment and the Expansion of the TVE Sector 
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy and the success of Chinese eco- 
nomic reform is largely due to the rapid expansion of the nonstate sector, in- 
cluding foreign-invested  firms. Here I would like to examine the interaction 
between foreign investment and other parts of the nonstate sector, in particular, 
the TVEs. 
As we observed in tables 3.8 and 3.9, the TVEs are the giants in the nonstate 
sector. Starting de nova in  1979, they already accounted for 20.2 percent of 
total industrial output by  1988 and gained 5 percentage points in share over 
the 1988-90  period. The two-year growth rate in TVE output was 64 percent 
(exp(0.492) -  1). Is the expansion of the TVE sector helped or curbed by the 
presence of foreign-invested firms? 
Table 3.13 reports some rudimentary regressions that may provide a sugges- 
tive (but speculative) answer to the question. The dependent variable  in all 
regressions is the growth rate in output by the TVEs. The regressors are the 
three ways  of  measuring the relative importance of  foreign capital in cities. 
The coefficients  are all positive  and, for the  last two measures,  statistically 
Table 3.13  Foreign Investment and Growth of the TVE Sector, 1988-90 
Intercept  .313* 
(.018) 
FDI88UCap88  .  18.5 
FDI88nUCap88 
(.137) 
N  339 
SEE  ,319 
Adjusted R’  ,003 
.313*  .313* 
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Notes: Dependent variable is growth rate of gross industrial output by TVEs during 1988-90.  See 
appendix for definitions of independent variables. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity- 
consistent standard errors. 
#*Significant  at the  1.5 percent level. 
“Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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significant at the 10 percent level. For example, a city with a 1 percent higher 
share of foreign firm output in  total output in  1988 is likely to have a 0.76 
percentage point higher growth rate for its TVE sector. 
This positive association could come from the additional competition that 
the presence of  foreign-invested firms provides for TVEs. But I think that it 
more likely results from certain positive externalities from the foreign firms to 
domestic TVEs.  One important  externality  is  technological  spillover. The 
other, possibly more important one, is modern management techniques, mar- 
keting, and work discipline that foreign-invested firms exhibit to the TVEs. 
Whatever the channels, the presence of foreign-invested firms appears to be 
helpful to the further expansion of the nonstate sector. 
3.5  Concluding Remarks 
Foreign investment in China comes disproportionately from overseas Chi- 
nese, particularly those residing in Hong Kong. An empirical norm of inward 
FDI is established as a function of the host country’s size, development level, 
literacy, and geographic location and source country characteristics based on 
data about geographic distribution of the outward FDI of the five largest source 
countries. Relative to an “average” host country, China appears to host too 
little foreign investment from all the major source countries (the United States, 
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) except Japan. 
The paper also attempts to assess several economic consequences of FDI in 
China. Based on city-level data, it finds statistically significant evidence that 
FDI is positively associated with cross-city differences in growth rates, after 
taking into account the growth of labor, physical, and human capital. Foreign- 
invested firms have higher export propensity than average Chinese firms. The 
paper tests and concludes that foreign-invested firms do not displace exports 
by  Chinese firms. Hence, their contribution to overall Chinese exports is at 
least the amount of their direct exports. Finally, the paper examines the interac- 
tion of FDI and the nonstate sector in China. There is some tentative evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that foreign-invested firms contribute positively to 
the rapid expansion of the township and village enterprises. 
Appendix 
Variable Acronyms in the Statistical Tables 
GPop-growth  rate of nonagricultural population. 
GCap-growth  rate of the net value of capital (“fixed asset”). 
FD188dCap88-ratio  of the stock of foreign capital to net value of capital in 
1988, where a 10 percent depreciation rate is assumed for foreign capital and 100  Shang-Jin Wei 
the official exchange rate in  1990 (3.72 yuaddollar) is used  to convert  the 
dollar value of FDI into the renminbi (RMB)  value. 
FD188nd/Cap88--ratio  of the stock of foreign capital to net value of capital in 
1988, where zero depreciation is assumed for foreign capital and the official 
exchange rate in 1990 (3.72 Yuaddollar) is used to convert the dollar value of 
FDI into the RMB  value. 
YFor88/Y88-share  of foreign-investedmanaged firms in total city output in 
1988. 
GHumCap-growth  rate of the average level of human capital, where average 
human capital is measured as share of skilled labor in the total nonagricultural 
labor force. 
Reform-dummy  for the 72 “comprehensive reform experimenting cities.” 
Open-dummy  for either 14 “coastal open cities”  or 4 “special  economic 
zones.” 
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Comment  Pakorn Vichyanond 
On sources of foreign direct investment (FDI), I have three observations. First, 
in the equations explaining stocks and flows of FDI, it is notable that labor cost 
is left out. This factor is crucial as it strongly influenced numerous Japanese 
corporations to relocate their production plants to China, Vietnam, and South- 
east Asia. Instead, the included variable is literacy, which is definitely less sig- 
nificant than relative wages as a determinant of FDI. 
Second, another important variable that was neglected is exchange rate fluc- 
tuation. This particular factor was very meaningful in inducing Japanese FDI 
in Thailand because exchange rate levels and volatility affect not only the costs 
but also the revenue or profits of private corporations. Therefore, exchange rate 
should be included as another prominent explanatory variable. 
Third, investment privileges given to tap FDI, such as tax exemptions or 
allowances, constitute another important determinant of FDI so they should be 
specifically treated. 
On consequences of FDI, my worries concern the host country or recipient 
of  FDI, not cross-city differences. Thus, the following questions are raised 
concerning the impact of FDI in a national context. 
First, it is usually unquestionable that FDI spurs economic growth in host 
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countries. The robust Thai economy in  1988-90,  for instance,  was strongly 
stimulated by investment, of which FDI constituted a growing portion. What 
deserves to be asked is, How sustainable is it to rely on FDI as a means to 
accelerate economic growth? Over time, labor cost grows higher and exchange 
rates vary; consequently, the attractions to FDI subside, so do the sizes of the 
markets of or in host countries. 
Second, the favorable impact of FDI  on exports of host countries is similar 
to the impact on economic growth. What should be investigated is how long 
export promotion can be achieved via FDI (e.g., privileges given to FDI with 
a prerequisite  of  a minimum  level of  exports  within  certain  years) because 
most export promotion measures are now deemed to be trade distortions. The 
GATT conclusions reached  in Morocco, for instance, were distinctly against 
agricultural  subsidies,  and those subsidies  are to be terminated  or reduced 
markedly within a specific time frame. 
Third, some negative repercussions  of  FDI should be recognized  and ad- 
dressed. Examples of such adverse effects are transfer pricing and environmen- 
tal degradation. The drug industry in Thailand suffered severely from the prob- 
lem of transfer pricing in the past. 
Finally, the merits of FDI may be questioned in several respects. For in- 
stance, historically  FDI deserves  attention or privileges because it naturally 
brings with it supporting capital funds, accommodating markets for commodi- 
ties to be produced, and technology from abroad. But in the current scenario 
where globalism  prevails  in most  regards,  those  merits  of  FDI may  not be 
deemed valuable anymore. Capital funds can be tapped worldwide. Accommo- 
dating markets can be found in newly opened countries, for example, China, 
Eastern Europe, and Indochina.  And  technology  transfer  has become more 
available on a commercial basis, or not necessarily tied to FDI. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that at present several developing countries have changed their 
viewpoints on FDI from the conventional perspective. In other words, FDI is 
not always heaven anymore. It is formidably challenged by numerous alterna- 
tives that do not have the adverse effects of FDI. 
Comment  Wing Thye WOO 
In this brilliant paper, Wei presents three propositions:  (1) FDI has positive 
effects on growth; (2)  FDI promotes growth of the nonstate sector; and (3)  FDI 
has come disproportionately from the Chinese diaspora. 
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FDI Promotes Economic Growth 
Wei’s proof comes from estimating 
(1)  Y = F (K,  L, FDI) 
across cities and finding that FDI is significantly positive for two of the three 
proxies used. A quick inspection of tables 3.10 and 3.1 1 reveals two troubling 
features.  First, equation (1) is a serious misspecification  of  the  production 
function because the dependent variable is gross industrial output and interme- 
diate input is not included as a regressor. Second, we have the anomalous situa- 
tion in which the theoretically preferred proxy (FDISSd/CapSS) is insignificant 
but the theoretically flawed proxy (FDISSndCapSS) is significant. The former 
assumes a 10 percent depreciation of  the foreign-owned capital stock, while 
the latter assumes zero depreciation. 
I do not doubt that FDI promotes growth, but I think that Wei’s empirical 
procedures are likely to have greatly overstated its contribution. My reserva- 
tions are based on the position that the fundamental reason for Chinese eco- 
nomic growth is the liberalization and hence marketization of  the command 
economy. We must be sensitive to the fact that FDI has occurred most in the 
cities where FDI has been legally allowed to occur, that is, the 5 special eco- 
nomic zones (SEZs), the 14 open coastal cities (OCCs), and the 72 comprehen- 
sive reform experimenting cities (CRECs). However, being allowed to liberal- 
ize and actually implementing liberalization are two different matters. Because 
not all local leaders are equally enthusiastic about introducing capitalist-style 
measures to boost economic development, local leaders differ considerably in 
their receptivity to FDI. My conjecture is that the regional distribution of FDI 
reflects to a considerable extent the degree of liberalization  actually imple- 
mented across the various cities. This means that one major reason why FDI 
has an output effect beyond its expansion of the capital stock is that in general 
FDI occurred in the cities that have liberalized the most and hence have raised 
their growth potential the most. In short, FDI is correlated with total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth because FDI is a good proxy for the degree of eco- 
nomic liberalization and the greater the liberalization, the higher TFP growth. 
Hereby, we also have the explanation for why the Reform and Open dum- 
mies (used to differentiate the SEZs, the OCCs, and the CRECs from the cities 
legally unfriendly to FDI) are statistically insignificant when they are added to 
equation (1). These dummies represent the formal granting of  liberalization 
authority to certain cities, whereas FDI represents the actual implementation of 
liberalization in the cities that have permission to do so. Since the continuous 
distribution of FDI is a better proxy of the regional degree of economic liberal- 
ization than the 0/1 dummies, the insignificance of the Reform and Open dum- 
mies only shows that the inclusion of FDI has robbed these dummies of their 
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It is likely that the statistical significance of FDI is also due to its also being 
a proxy for favored access to intermediate inputs. Price liberalization is most 
advanced in  the cities where FDI is most concentrated, and  since prices  of 
intermediate inputs are the highest in these cities, they suffer no shortage of 
intermediate inputs. Simply put, FDI is more likely to flow to cities with no 
power shortages than to cities with chronic power shortages. 
FDI Promotes Growth of the Nonstate Sector 
Wei’s proof of this proposition consists of regressing 
(2)  Y of TVEs =  f(FD1) 
and finding that two of  the three proxies for FDI are statistically significant 
(see table 3.13). We note that equation (2) is a greater misspecification of the 
production function than equation (I) because it has no input variables as re- 
gressors. 
We also note that since FDI is a proxy for the degree of economic liberaliza- 
tion, it should be natural that it is positively correlated with the output growth 
of  the  nonstate  sector,  another by-product  of  economic  liberalization.  It  is 
therefore somewhat surprising that one of the FDI proxies failed to be signifi- 
cant in such a favorable setting. Perhaps, gross misspecification  has a role in 
the unexpected result. 
How Big Is FDI’s Contribution to Growth? 
The facts are: Poland is more marketized  than China, China has more FDI 
than Poland, and China has grown faster than Poland. These facts, however, do 
not show that FDI is a better promoter of  growth than marketization, just as 
the Chinese experience does not show that gradual reform is superior to Polish- 
style rapid and comprehensive reforms. 
The high growth of China, the great amount of FDI in China, and the explo- 
sive growth of the town and village enterprise (TVE) sector are all products of 
the marketization  of  a labor-surplus peasant economy  (see Sachs and Woo 
1994). In 1978,  over three-quarters of the Chinese labor force were engaged in 
subsistence farming, the peasants were kept down on the farms by the House- 
hold Registration  System, and the official estimate was that one-third of  the 
farm labor force was surplus labor. The high aggregate growth rate and the 
growth of TVE output are the results of the absorption of surplus agricultural 
labor and the absence of the need to reduce the state industrial sector to release 
labor for the growth of the TVEs. The inflow of FDI to China is the natural 
response to the low wages of the surplus labor economy. 
FDI doubtlessly increases TFP directly by technological transfers and indi- 
rectly by providing an efficient management style to be emulated by  the Chi- 
nese enterprises. However, Wei’s estimated contribution of FDI to TFP growth 
is an overstatement  of  these direct and indirect effects because of  the close 
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A Disproportionate Amount of FDI Is from the Chinese Diaspora 
The bulk of the empirical work in the paper involves estimating an interna- 
tional norm of  investment  (see tables 3.3-3.7).  This may  seem a somewhat 
puzzling exercise. What is the policy implication of finding that Western Eu- 
rope and the United States are underinvesting in China unless China can impe- 
riously demand that the laggards double their FDI efforts? One is therefore left 
wondering about the role and importance of section 3.3 in this excellent paper. 
I think that section 3.3 implies a very important hypothesis that should not 
be overlooked (and that should be tested by the author in a future paper)-a 
point more important to Eastern Europe and Russia than to China. As most 
FDI in China has been from the Chinese diaspora, this means that the other 
transition economies (except for Vietnam) that do not have large diasporas are 
unlikely to experience significant income growth from FDI. 
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